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JUSTIFYING SUBVERSION: WHY NUSSBAUM GOT (THE
BETTER INTERPRETATION OF) BUTLER WRONG
BY ORI J. HERSTEIN∗
“If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as
doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes
certainty.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most common critiques directed at
deconstructive and poststructuralist theories is that they are
amoral – rejecting the validity of the very idea of norms and
moral principles as grounds for justifying or criticizing
political action and social structures – and that in rejecting
the validity of the distinction between what is just and what is
unjust, they “collaborate with evil.”2 By now, an almost
canonical example of this common critique is found in Martha
Nussbaum’s highly critical essay on the work of Judith
Butler, titled The Professor of Parody.3 Here, I focus on
Nussbaum’s critique and on Butler’s work as examples of the
“common
critique”
and
of
deconstruction
and
poststructuralism in political theory. I argue that the more
modest and sounder understanding of Butler – taken as a
deconstructive and poststructuralist theorist – is not
susceptible to these accusations of amorality and
collaboration with evil.
Even if Butler’s deconstructive poststructuralist theory
does not, as a matter of fact, justify adopting any
∗

Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell University Law School.
For their comments on previous drafts of this article, I am
grateful to Leora Bilsky and Noa Ben-Asher. I am especially grateful to
Katherine Franke from whose seminar this article originated.
1 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 115 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969).
2 Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 28,
2000, at 37, 45.
3 Id.
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deconstructive agenda or subversive project of any specific
political order, social practice, norm, or moral principle, it also
does not necessarily undermine the ideas of moral and
normative justification of specific acts of political
deconstruction and subversion. According to (what I take as)
the better reading of Butler’s theory and of deconstructive
theory in general, all subversion and deconstruction
inherently take place in relation to a relatively stable set of
background norms, structures of meaning, descriptive
assumptions, practices, and values. Such a background is a
necessary enabling condition for any act of deconstruction and
for the performance of any subversion or parody; a
background that may, and often does, comprise moral values,
norms, and principles that guide and justify specific
deconstructive and parodic actions. Therefore, while Butler’s
theory, as an example of deconstructive and poststructuralist
approaches to politics, does not consist of any such norms,
values, or reasons justifying or rejecting any particular
political action, Butler’s theory does not necessarily rule out
grounding or justifying the undertaking of a particular parody
or deconstructive agenda in value- or moral-driven practical
reasoning.
Moreover, Butler’s theory of subversion is
deconstructive at its core and as such, cannot be attributed
with making generalized propositions, including metaethical
propositions rejecting all principles of political morality.
Hence, Nussbaum’s position – that Butler’s theory entails an
amoral approach to political theory and action and therefore,
“collaborate[s] with evil” – is erroneous.
This essay begins with introducing Nussbaum’s
critique of Butler’s gender theory (Section I); it then sets out to
explore the role moral justification plays in Butler’s gender
theory, which first requires delving into Butler’s work at some
length (Section II). Next, Butler’s account of how the gender
structure of identity and social structures can be resisted and
subverted is introduced (Section III); in the end, the merits of
Nussbaum’s argument and of the “common critique” turn on
choosing between two alternative interpretations of what
poststructuralism is.
The first interpretation is labeled
“universal poststructuralism,” the interpretation assumed by
the common critique and in Nussbaum’s critique of Butler
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and of poststructuralism and deconstruction in general. The
second
interpretation
is
labeled
“contextual
poststructuralism.” This second version is not susceptible to
the common critique. This essay argues that the “contextual
reading” of Butler is better in tune with poststructuralism and
deconstruction in general, and that when understood in its
terms Butler’s gender theory is not susceptible to the common
critique (Section IV).
I. NUSSBAUM’S CRITICISM OF BUTLER OR
THE “COMMON CRITIQUE”
In her essay, Nussbaum poses the following challenge:
Suppose we grant Butler . . . that the social
structure of gender is ubiquitous, but we can
resist it by subversive and parodic acts. Two
significant questions remain. What should be
resisted, and on what basis? What would the
acts of resistance be like, and what would we
expect them to accomplish?4
It is the first pair of questions that interests me here.
In the most general terms, when Nussbaum asks on what
basis Butler’s theory allows to choose and justify acts of
subversion against what she calls the “ubiquitous social
structure,” Nussbaum is in fact doubting (and later denying)
whether poststructuralist theory allows for morally justifying
or rejecting any particular political action or agenda.
According to Nussbaum, “Butler cannot explain in any purely
structural or procedural way why the subversion of gender
norms is a social good while the subversion of justice norms is
a social bad.”5
Nussbaum makes two arguments in support of her
criticism. First, she claims that as a matter of fact, Butler
simply does not attempt to justify the rightness of her political
projects, but simply assumes they are just. Examples of this
absence of moral justification can be found in the chapter on
4
5

Id.
Id.
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gay subversion in Butler’s Bodies That Matter.6 There, Butler
seems not only sympathetic towards subversion of the
heterosexual-centric social structure, but also positions
herself as part of this subversive political project. She does so
with no effort at justification. The same is true of Butler’s
discussion of the merits of gay marriage, which is conducted
on the basis of the assumption that gay liberation should be
promoted and persevered.7 Once again, Butler does not
explicitly mention these moral principles, although one
cannot but feel that they are presupposed in the background
as the obvious motivation for the project. Another example is
found in Butler’s discussion of hate speech in her book
Excitable Speech, where she argues that censorship of hate
speech closes options for subversion, which are opened to the
victim group, taking this as a reason for opposing
censorship.8 Therefore, there seems to be some validity to
Nussbaum’s first critique. Nevertheless, such examples only
demonstrate that as a matter of fact, Butler does not always
justify her politics and subversive agendas. They do not,
however, prove that Butler’s theory inherently rejects the
possibility of justifying or rejecting certain acts of subversion,
parody, and deconstruction as virtuous or illegitimate.
Nussbaum’s second argument in support of her
critique is categorical, yet underdeveloped. According to
Nussbaum, Butler’s theory is adverse to the very idea of
justifying political projects because such justifications are
based on principles and ideals that are perceived to be good
and serve as axioms for moral justification. Examples of such
ideals are human dignity, always treating people also as ends
and not only as means, basic human needs, autonomy, and
Nussbaum’s own favorite core political value, equality or
respect. The reason Nussbaum attributes to Butler’s rejection
of any such moral values and principles is that, according to
Nussbaum, Butler views them as “inherently dictatorial.”9
6
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 121-42 (Routledge 1993)
[hereinafter BODIES].
7
Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual? 13.1
DIFFERENCES: A J. OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 14 (2002).
8 See, e.g.,
JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE
PERFORMATIVE 160 (Routledge 1997) [hereinafter EXCITABLE SPEECH].
9 Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
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The common critique is not Nussbaum’s only critique
of Butler. She also argues that the lack of ethical grounds in
Butler’s writing has steered many feminists onto an amoral,
non-practical, aesthetic, and almost autistic path, away from
addressing actual, practical questions of gender injustice. In
addition, Nussbaum rails against Butler’s style of writing,
which she views as sophistic and intentionally opaque.
Nussbaum is also highly critical of the mode of political action
Butler’s theory allows for – parodic and symbolic subversion
rather than material change, which Nussbaum views as selfindulgent and of little utility. All three critiques have at least
some truth to them. However, my concern here is only with
that which I labeled the “common critique” – that Butler’s
theory (and poststructuralism and deconstructive theory in
general) rules out any and all moral justification for political
action.
II. BUTLER’S THEORY OF GENDER CONSTRUCTION
In order to understand Nussbaum’s position, it is
imperative to understand what she takes Butler’s gender
theory to be. In Bodies That Matter, Butler lays out her
theory of how human bodies are always-already
constructed into categories of gender. In Excitable Speech,
Butler makes a similar point by arguing, based on
Althusser’s concept of interpellation,10 that we alwaysalready exist as recognizable subjects according to some
ideology.
“[O]ne comes to ‘exist’ by virtue of this
fundamental dependency on the address of the Other. One
exists not only by the virtue of being recognized but, in a
prior sense, by being recognizable.”11

According to Althusser, people always exist as subjects of some
ideology; we are always-already interpellated by or into some ideology.
We enter ideologies through the process of interpellation, in which we
accept the ideological framework as true, or in other words perceive
ourselves as subjects of the ideology. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in LENIN
AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 87-126 (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly
Review Press 2001) (1971).
11 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 160.
10
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Since people are always-already constructed as such
(as people), it follows that there is no such thing as a natural
or pre-social human essence. This is because before being
constructed as social/speaking (i.e. as symbolic beings, under
Lacanian theory) or interpellated beings (under an
Althusserian approach), we were not people. There is no
natural (i.e. pre-social) state of personhood, and therefore,
there is no such thing as a human body “belonging” to a
person that is not already socially constructed.
Furthermore, for Butler, human bodies are not only
always-already socialized, but are also similarly gendered
(through ongoing processes of performance). We never
encounter our body as ours (in the sense of being the body
of a person) prior to its being categorized as the body of a
female or a male. Moreover, we always encounter ourselves
(as people) as already-categorized by gender.
While in Excitable Speech Butler draws more on
Althusser’s theory of ideology and interpellation to explain
this idea of being already-constituted, in Bodies That
Matter, she draws more on a Lacanian theory of child
Regardless of the psychological or
development.12
sociological explanation, the basic idea is the same – we
exist always as already-constructed beings. When a baby
turns into a person, it does not transform into a generic
person, but is always transformed into either a he or a she.
In becoming a person, one is labeled as either male or
12 According to Lacan, a person or subject is not “born” at birth.
At
birth, a baby is yet to be a person; it is only disjointed bodily and sensual
sensations. A baby begins to form into a person only after it internalizes
the image of the complete Other as its own (in the “mirror stage”) and
later by entering the realm of the symbolic. Here, the baby becomes a
subject by internalizing the point of view of the Other, understanding the
relation between itself and its own reflection not as a sameness relation,
but as a symbolic one, i.e., as that of a signified and signifier. In this
stage, the baby also internalizes the structure of language: by searching
for the approval that the image in the mirror is really its own image, the
baby internalizes the logic of language, which requires the point of view
of the Other to stabilize and ratify the signifying relations. Jacques
Lacan, The Mirror Stage, in ECRITS: A SELECTION 3-9 (Bruce Fink and Alan
Sheridan trans., W. W. Norton Company Inc. 1977) (1966); SAMUEL
WEBER, RETURN TO FREUD: JACQUES LACAN’S DISLOCATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
7-19 (Michael Levine trans., Cambridge University Press 1991).
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female through the intersection of the psychological
dynamic of child development and the heterosexual
structure of kinship.13
Distinctions between bodies predicated on “sex” are
initially drawn on the basis of identifying a baby’s
reproductive organs.
However, this physiological based
categorization is not as neutral or natural as one may think.
The category of “sex” does not function like categorizing
people by blood type. Being ascribed a sex, i.e. being born “a
boy” or “a girl,” means being ascribed a whole identity that is
constructed by social norms and which determines the course
of one’s life.
Furthermore, Butler points out that our gendered
identity is closely interrelated with sexual orientation identity.
Being ascribed a gender is interrelated with being ascribed
one of the two heterosexual roles.14 According to Butler,
being a “woman” always means being a heterosexual woman.
The idea of a lesbian woman is adverse to the social construct
of “woman”15 – it is, in a sense, unintelligible.
It is important to note that neither the identity
categorization nor the social meanings these identities entail
are up to us. We only exist, as the persons we are, after being
constituted and molded according to these categories,
categories that were molded prior to our birth by social norms
we had no hand in establishing. According to Butler,
Once “sex” itself is understood in its
normativity, the materiality of the body will not
be thinkable apart from the materialization of
that regulatory form. “Sex” is not simply what
one has, or a static description of what one is:
it will be one of the norms by which the “one”
becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a

13 Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of
Sex, in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157-210 (Rayna R. Reiter ed.,
Monthly Review Press 1975). Butler seems to accept Rubin’s kinship
concept. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 7.
14 Rubin, supra note 13.
15 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE xi-xiv (Routledge 1999) [hereinafter
GENDER TROUBLE].
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body for life within the domain of cultural
intelligibility.16
Elsewhere Butler explains that “[t]he terms that
facilitate recognition are themselves conventional, the effects
and instruments of a social ritual that decide, often through
exclusion and violence, the linguistic conditions of survivable
objects.”17
This preexisting and controlling social structure is
what Nussbaum is referring to when she says that according
to Butler, “the social structure of gender is ubiquitous.”18
Assessing the validity of Nussbaum’s critique requires figuring
out whether the ubiquitous social structure of identity, as the
idea emerges from Butler’s poststructuralist theory, allows for
opposing, critiquing, and resisting it “from within,” and if so,
does Butler’s theory allow for morally judging certain
resistance and subversion as just and others as wrong.
Nussbaum, as a proponent of the common critique, believes
that such judgments and justifications are ruled out by
Butler’s account of social construction. Nussbaum’s error
derives from a mistaken understanding of Butler’s
poststructuralist and deconstructive approach to the
ubiquitous social structure of gender.
III. RESISTING THE UBIQUITOUS STRUCTURE
“FROM WITHIN”
A. Resistance and the Ubiquitous Structure –
the Structuralist Account
One problem with all-inclusive structuralist theories is
that they lack both the ability to verify/criticize and
justify/refute themselves.
According to the structuralist
account of gender construction, we all always-already exist
within an all-embracing and stable gender-constituting
structure.
From this, it follows that any possibility of
criticizing, or of even being aware of this structure, is
impossible. If we are constituted by and trapped within this
16
17
18

BODIES, supra note 6, at 2.
EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 5.
Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
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all-enveloping gender-constituting construct, which professes
to be neutral, natural, true, just, and essential, it must follow
that we (the would-be social critics) and our critical faculties
are also similarly constructed. Thus, how can we critique
such a system, let alone resist it?
Under such a closed all-inclusive structure, a
constructed identity is not unlike a Kantian transcendental
category. One cannot perceive beyond the structure for it
constitutes not only who one is, but also one’s categories of
perception and one’s very ability to perceive and categorize.
Since we are always-already constructed, we have no nonconstructed point of view from which we are free from our
already constructed conceptual schema. In gender terms,
this entails that all we know and all we can know are gender
and the existing gender relations. Hence, a critical theory
claiming that gender is anything less than a transcendental
category (if not also natural, essential, and real) is nonsense
within such a ubiquitous schema. In addition, a critical
structuralist theory is epistemically impossible for the social
structure leaves no room for resisting or subverting it –
neither from the “outside” for the structure is ubiquitous, nor
from the “inside” for there is no space between our conceptual
and critical faculties and the ubiquitous gender structure
allowing, enabling, and setting the parameters for any critical
reflection.
An example of a structuralist account in the field of
gender theory is found in the writing of Catharine
MacKinnon,19 who argues that gender relations and gender
itself are constructed within a closed, self-justifying system in
which men hold the position of power and women are their
objects of subordination. This is a closed system of social
construction in which all are assigned a stable identity and
none can escape it.
However, Butler is not a structuralist, but a poststructuralist. This entails that although Butler accepts that
For example, “men create the world from their own point of view,
which then becomes the truth to be described. This is a closed system,
not anyone’s confusion.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7.3 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN
CULTURE AND SOC’Y 537 (1982).
19
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identity is always-already constructed (i.e., there is no
personhood outside or prior to structure since identity is
only intelligible in relation to and within a structure) and
that identity is subject to the Sausserean concept of
meaning as difference rather than to principles of inherent
essence or self-definition,20 Butler does not accept the idea
of an all-inclusive structure of meaning that is complete and
entirely stable.
According to Butler, resistance of the
ubiquitous social structure is possible through identity
subversion and parody.
B. Resistance and the Ubiquitous Structure – Butler’s
Poststructuralist Account of Identity
1. Performance and Reiteration
For Butler, the construction of identity does not end
with a person’s symbolic baptism (Lacan) or naming
(Althusser), which initiates our “birth” as people. According to
Butler, “the rules that constrain the intelligibility of the
20 Ferdinand de Saussure claimed that the relation of the linguistic
signifier to its signified, i.e. the relation which constitutes meaning in
language, is not determined by some special inherent relation of
reference between the sign and its signified. There is nothing essential or
natural in the meanings ascribed to different linguistic signs. Meaning
in language is rather a function of the relations between the various
signifiers within the language. Language is an array of signifiers and the
relations of difference between them. These differences between the
signs are what determine their meaning, i.e. each signifier is ascribed a
signified according to the former’s place within the “web of signifiers.” A
linguistic sign outside the web of difference relations is an oxymoron – in
order for a sound or scribble to become a signifier, it must be part of a
structure of difference.
Under Saussure’s account of language, there is a place within
the stable structure of meaning for supreme or privileged concepts upon
which other meanings are grounded. This is because in a web of
differences, while signifiers are assigned meaning on the basis of
difference relations and not due to any factors inherent to the signifier,
meanings are still firmly assigned. Thus, while Saussure’s theory of
meaning as difference seemingly does away with the idea of a
transcendent self-defining concept, it allows for a stable structure with
clear nexuses of “power,” gravity, and centrality. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE,
COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally et al. eds., Wade Bas trans.,
McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1959).
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subject continue to structure the subject throughout his or
her life.”21
However, the mere fact that the construction of our
identity is an ongoing project does not mean a person can
autonomously redefine his/her identity – that is a liberty we
do not have.
Because the subject is always-already
embedded, an autonomous and self-defining subject is
impossible since there is no meaning or viable self outside or
autonomous of the social structure of meaning. Moreover,
such an exercise in autonomy would be self-destructive for it
would undermine the schema that constitutes and gives
meaning to one’s own identity.22 Therefore, attempts to
subvert or reject the ongoing construction of one’s identity
come with great personal danger.
If the subject speaks impossibly, speaks in
ways that cannot be regarded as speech or as
the speech of a subject, then that speech is
discounted and the viability of the subject
called into question. The consequences of
such an irruption of the unspeakable may
range from a sense that one is “falling apart” to
the intervention of the State to secure criminal
or psychiatric incarceration.23
Throughout our lives, we constantly reaffirm our
identity by living according to our ascribed roles. Butler
explains this constant reconstitution as a product of a
compulsive need to reaffirm and stabilize our identity as
natural or essential.24
For example, gender identity is
maintained and reinforced when we speak in a gendered way
and participate and follow gendered institutions, practices,
styles, norms of behavior, social activities, ontological
EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 136.
I am using figurative speech here in assuming a self that is prior to the
constituted subject. For Butler, there is no self who “owns” or “carries”
its socially constructed self.
23 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 136.
24 Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in I NSIDE/O UT :
LESBIAN T HEORIES, G AY T HEORIES 13, 24 (Diana Fuss ed., Routledge
1991) [hereinafter Imitation].
21
22
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categories, etc., all of which we constantly perform. This
adherence to the gender matrix not only originates from the
risk to one’s own intelligibility and the compulsion to affirm
one’s own identity for fear of losing it, but also from the fact
we are constructed to believe that the gender structure is
natural, true, real, etc. In other words, “the anticipation of a
gendered essence produces that which it posits outside
itself.”25 Butler also explains that the construction of identity
is a temporal process, made up of actual specific acts.
Identity “construction is neither a single act nor a causal
process initiated by a subject and culminating in a set of fixed
effects. Construction not only takes place in time, but is itself
a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of
norms.”26
The temporal, specific, and performative nature of
identity construction is key to a poststructuralist approach to
politics; it entails that, in a sense, the social structure itself is
not frozen and stable as it is depicted under the structuralist
account, but rather it “lives” in time and in the particular acts
of its performance. Put differently, by acting according to our
constructed identity roles, we not only reconstruct our own
identity, but are also recreating the very social structure to
which we are adhering. Moreover, we adhere to the social
structure because we believe (wrongly) it is already “there”
irrespective of our acceptance and performance of it. Thus,
according to Butler, by applying the language of gender and
thinking through the conceptual schema of gender, we are in
fact creating gender. Following John Austin’s concept of
performative speech acts, Butler claims that by using the
language of the gender structure, we actually create not
only our own identity, but also the gender structure itself.
Butler’s claim – that the existence of the gender structure is
constituted in its particular performances – derives from
her understanding of gender structure as a form of
language, which under deconstructive theory (as we shall
soon see) exists only as reiteration. The creation of identity
through reiteration is what Butler means by her theory of
performance.
25
26

EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note8, at xv (emphasis added).
BODIES, supra note 6, at 10.
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Building on her theory of performance, Butler suggests
we can also subvert the seemingly unbreakable self-recreating
circle of meaning and performance. According to her, “sex is
both produced and destabilized in the course of this
reiteration. . . .
This instability is the deconstituting
possibility in the very process of repetition . . . the possibility
to put the consolidation of the norms of ‘sex’ into a potentially
productive crisis.”27
2. Iterability and the Instability of Structure
Butler explains how the subversion and destabilization
of the ubiquitous gender structure is possible by coupling her
idea of gender performance as speech act with a
deconstructive notion of language as reiteration.
Jacques Derrida accounts for the role of iterability in
language through the metaphor of the signature.28 The
concept of a signature demands it be iterable, in other words
for a signature to “work” (i.e., to be a signature as opposed to
merely a scribble of someone’s name), it must be a duplication
of the original Signature. What makes a scribble into a
signature is the fact that it is a reiteration of what we already
know as The Signature. People cannot sign their names
completely differently every time; if they did, they would just
be writing out their names, not signing it. However, in
practice we never encounter The Signature; all we encounter
are specific occurrences of “it” (i.e., actual signatures).29
Hence, while a scribble is only a signature if it is a reiteration
of The Signature, in actuality, we can never point to or signify
the original (i.e., The Signature), because the original
categorically precedes even the first time we sign our names.
Therefore, we are always left with a copy, which entails that

Id.
JACQUES D ERRIDA, LIMITED I NC. 31-34 (Samuel Weber trans.,
Northwestern Univ. Press 1988) (1977).
29 Even when we sign our name for the first time, that signature can only
be a signature if it too is a reiteration of some nonconcrete original. If we
do not take it to be a first concretization of some original, it cannot be
regarded as a signature.
27
28
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the original only exists in its concrete duplications. In other
words, we are reiterating an original that is never “there.”30
According to Derrida, language follows a similar logic to
that of a signature. When we use language, we do not invent
it as we go along. The concept of language necessarily entails
that the words we use already have meaning. Language does
not erupt spontaneously from the speaking subject; it
necessarily has a history and a structure of meaning that is
independent of the speaking subject. However, while the
concept of language demands it have a “source” component
that can be reiterated, we never encounter (in language) the
original source of meaning we are reiterating. Any attempt to
express The Language or to capture The Meaning or The
Signified of specific signs is doomed to fail. Any such attempt
will always only be a particular reiteration, a signifier, and a
token of the unattainable original signified or type. We search
for The Source, but can only encounter “The Source”; we
aspire to The Meaning, The Signified, or The Signature, but
can only attain “The Meaning,” “The Signified,” or “The
Signature.” As Butler explains, “One speaks a language that
is never fully one’s own, but that language only persists
through repeated occasions of that invocation. That language
gains its temporal life only in and through the utterances that
reinvoke and restructure the conditions of its own
possibility.”31 Hence, language is always in limbo – in one
sense, it is a source of meaning that is drawn upon and
reiterated in specific language use (“One speaks a language
that is never fully one’s own . . . .”), and in another sense, it
exists only in particular uses (iterations).
Thus, while
language is reiterable, it is also nothing more than iteration.
Butler’s theory of performance draws on Derrida’s
account of language. When we reconstruct our identity
through performing and adhering to the language and the
conceptual schema of the social structure, we are in fact
reiterating the social structure. For example, when we act
“like a woman,” we are acting like the model of The Woman
embedded in the social gender structure. We are acting as a
30 See GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xv (indicating that the
metaphor of “The Ritual” does similar work as the signature metaphor).
31 EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 140.
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token of an archetype. However, similarly to how language
only exists in its reiteration, the gender structure we are
reiterating only exists in our particular performance of it.
“[G]ender [as well as sexual orientation] is a kind of imitation
for which there is no original; in fact, it is a kind of imitation
that produces the very notion of the original as an effect and
consequence of the imitation itself.”32
This type of
performance is subject to Derrida’s logic of the signature.
Just as we never encounter The Signified or The Language as
such, only “The Signified” and “The Language,” we never really
encounter or fully reiterate the social structure or the type of
identities it comprises, only imitations.
The reason the concept of iterability is applicable to
gender performance is that, according to Butler, the process
of gendering takes place in language, in symbolism, and
through our gendered conceptual schema via which we
attribute meanings to the world. Hence, in “acting like,”
talking, and thinking in a gendered way, we are performing a
reiteration of something that only exists in its iterations.
Furthermore, just as every actual signature is slightly
different from its other particular counterparts, so our acts of
performance are all slightly different from each other. In
other words, there is room for incremental differences and
variety in the reiterating activity. We are like a community of
Santa Claus impersonators: while all Santa Claus
impersonators are different individuals, they are still all Santa
Claus impersonators, and it is this relation of similarity that
constitutes what the original Santa Claus – who does not exist
– “is.”33 Thus, if a person acts or speaks in a manner that
transgresses this relation of sameness and, therefore, is no
longer identifiable as a reiteration (for example, one cannot
impersonate Santa Claus by dressing up to look like a teapot),
he/she in a sense falls “out of language” – his/her identity as
a Santa Claus impersonator dissolves, and he/she will cease
to “make sense” (as a Santa Claus). Losing one’s identity as a
Imitation, supra note 24, at 21(emphasis omitted).
A similarity that is perhaps best characterized by the Wittgensteinian
concept of a “family resemblance.
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
P HILOSOPHICAL I NVESTIGATIONS § 65-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
Macmillan 1972) (1953).
32
33
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Santa Claus impersonator is not so tragic; in contrast,
however, totally discarding gender may not only cause one to
cease being a “he” or a “she,” but, because the conception of a
human being is that of a gendered being, one also runs the
risk of becoming some “it,” i.e., not fully human. Thus, the
extent of the space allowed for changing The Structure of
identity through performance is limited to the realm in which
that performance is still recognized as related to or as a
variation of that structure.
What remains to be proven is how the poststructuralist
account succeeds where the structuralist account failed: how
is subverting the “ubiquitous social structure” possible if we
are always-already constructed by it and completely
immersed in it?
3. Agency
Butler claims that agency is a necessary component of
structure and identity construction because both depend, for
their existence or intelligibility, on being performed.34
According to Butler, the human subject is produced as an
effect of the performance/structure relation and therefore,
there is no subject prior to performance.35 Butler proposes
that “agency begins where sovereignty wanes. [One is free to
act] to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor
and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling
constraints from the outset.”36 Our agency is therefore a
product of construction – under the poststructuralist account
of social structure, the human agent is an inherent effect as
well as the cause of any structure.
From this, it seems to follow that we are free to subvert
the social structure “from within” because the agent is the
creator of structure and as such, has the power to recreate or
deconstruct the social structure through its performance.
However, according to Butler, the extent of autonomy involved
in this agency is highly limited.

34
35
36

Imitation, supra note 24, at 22-23.
Id. at 24.
EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 16.
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[T]he agency denoted by the performativity of
“sex” will be directly counter to any notion of a
voluntarist subject who exists quite apart from
the regulatory norms which she/he opposes.
The paradox of subjectivation . . . is precisely
that the subject who would resist such norms
is itself enabled, if not produced, by such
norms. Although this constitutive constraint
does not foreclose the possibility of agency, it
does locate agency as a reiterative or
rearticulatory practice, immanent to power,
and not a relation of external opposition to
power.37
Thus, while the social structure enables our agency, it
also sets its limits. In a sense, we are only free to perform the
social structure and norms into which we are alreadyinterpellated.
Still, Butler points out that being constituted by a
discourse does not necessarily entail being fully determined
by that discourse.38 Our agency is produced within the
space created between the structure and its performance.
Within this space, we are free to perform and reiterate the
discourse of the social structure in ways that may stray
from their former ideal discursive type.
Such
transformation and subversion is possible so long as it is
still identifiable as a reiteration of the discourse. By
employing this tactic of subversion, the agent exposes the
seemingly natural structure, concept, or identity type as no

BODIES, supra note 6, at 15.
“That cogito is never fully of the cultural world that it negotiates, no
matter the narrowness of the ontological distance that separates that subject
from its cultural predicates.” GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at 182
(emphasis omitted). “[A]ll signification takes place within the orbit of the
compulsion to repeat; ‘agency,’ then, is to be located within the
possibility of a variation on that repetition. If the rules governing
signification not only restrict but enable the assertion of alternative
domains of cultural intelligibility, i.e. new possibilities for gender that
contest the rigid codes of hierarchical binarisms, then it is only within
the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity becomes
possible.” Id. at 185 (emphasis omitted).

37
38
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more than an effect of our constructed “anticipation.”39 In
this, subversion is an act of deconstruction, deconstructing
the elements of the social structure and of one’s own
identity – it is the poststructuralist mode of political
resistance.
C. The (Political) Effects of Subversion –
Deconstructing Privileged Concepts
1. The Idea of a Privileged/Sovereign Concept
Structure, such as the structure of gender, most often
entails centers of power supporting and bolstering the
structure. While no structure of meaning is completely frozen
and entirely stable, structures always retain some degree of
stability and inner logic, which are bolstered and expressed in
their privileged concepts. The “privileged concepts” may take
many forms, depending on the nature of the structure. They
may be a principle, a constitution, a leader, a faith, God, the
majority, etc. For example, in political/legal constructs, the
ruling concept is the sovereign; in algebra, it is the axiom.
From within the structure, the privileged concept is
perceived as self-justifying and natural. It is fact, real, true,
transcendent, self-evident, self-defining, clear and distinct,
and celestial. Because of their assumed “autonomy” and selfjustifying nature, privileged concepts seem not to depend on
the structure they are imbedded in for their meaning,
legitimacy, or truth-value; rather, the opposite seems true – it
is the structure that depends on its core foundational
concepts. Just as the sovereign’s authority precedes and
trumps legal authority, the privileged concepts precede the
system of meaning. Hence, in different structures, the “seat
of power,” “the throne,” or in Lacanian terms, the “place of the
real”40 may be inhabited by a different privileged self-justifying
39 Similarly to how the anticipation of the one “standing before law”
creates the power of the law which bars his/her entrance, we create
gender through our belief in its being true and essential. Id. at xiv.
40 According to Lacan, the place of “the real,” which is formed in our
psyche as a resolution to the Oedipus complex, is essentially empty. We
fill this empty “place” with signs, which substitute and stand in the place
of The Real, tragically and hopelessly trying to be The Real. However,
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“concept” or entity.
In any case, they all embody a
transcendence typical of a sovereign: both preceding and
embedded within the structure they “rule over.”
2. Deconstructing the Privileged or Sovereign Concept
and Exposing Its Violence
In subversive performance, we make evident the
privileged concepts through becoming aware of their
particularity, temporality, contingency, replaceability, and the
fact that their legitimacy is not self-justifying, but dependent
on their privileged position within the structure in relation to
other concepts – similarly to how the meaning of a word is not
essential to it but is derived from the contingent web of
relations of linguistic differences.41
A common method of deconstruction is to expose the
constitutive dichotomy a particular structure is based on by
implementing a Hegelian Master-Slave-like analysis. The
deconstructionist demonstrates how the sovereign concept is
not self-defining, natural, or self-justifying, but rather
dependent on a Siamese-twin concept, which is set up as the
negation or duplicate of the privileged concepts. For example,
Butler demonstrates how the concept of heterosexuality
derives its social status as natural, primary, and legitimate
not from anything inherent in heterosexuality, but rather from
its negation to homosexuality, which is deemed unnatural,
derivative, and deviant. This theory of meaning, based on
relations and difference rather than essence, rejects the very

since the place of The Real is empty and The Real unattainable, all that
stands in “its” place can only try to signify “it.” Yet, because in effect
nothing is signified or rather it is the signification of “nothing,” such
substitutions always fail. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Norton 1988) (1975).
41 An example is found in Butler’s analysis of drag, which, according to
her, indicates that gender identity does not necessarily correspond to
only one sex and that all gendering is an act of “dressing up” according
to some ideal. For example, Butler argues that “[d]rag constitutes the
mundane way in which genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn
and done; it implies that all gendering is a kind of impersonation and
approximation.” Imitation, supra note 24, at 21.
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idea of self-definition and the notion that a transcendent,
autonomous, self-justifying concept is possible.
By exposing such dichotomies through subversive
performance, we diffuse our constructed and compulsive
expectation that the structure and the identities it sets up
have some inner authority we must adhere to and emulate.
For example, Butler explains that because no sexual identity
is natural, homosexuality is positioned as a derivative and a
deviant copy of heterosexuality,42 thereby producing
heterosexuality as the natural sexual identity in relation to its
marginalized dichotomous concept “homosexuality.” Through
subversion, we expose constructed identity to be “drag” or
performance rather than natural or essential; we learn that
the production of some identities as natural and original
always comes at the expense of others who are
positioned/produced as deviant and derivative identities.
The next step in the deconstructive method is exposing
the power and violence that artificially elevate one of the
dichotomous concepts to the status of a sovereign or
privileged concept. This is usually achieved through bringing
the “slave concept” to the fore and showing how the “sovereign
concept” came to be thought of as such through the
marginalization, oppression, and delegitimation of its
dichotomous concept. It is shown that only through the
“erasing,” “silencing,” and delegitimizing of its dichotomous
concept can a concept be transformed into a sovereign
concept, regarded as natural, self-defining, original, and
nonrelational.43
If we accept this account of how “natural,” “original,”
“self-justifying,” and “essential” concepts are produced, it
follows that the introduction of such privileged concepts into
political theory – often in the form of moral principles – will
always also incorporate violence and subordination.
Accordingly, violence is always prior and constitutive to any
justificatory schema based on privileged principles. Thus,
principles of political morality, a type of privileged principles,

Id. at 17-21.
The deconstructive analysis is conceptual, not necessarily entailing an
actual historical process of subjugating one concept to the other.
42
43

64

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XVIII

do not derive their force from any innate essential morality,
but from a pre-moral history of violence.
After understanding how resistance of the “ubiquitous
social structure” is possible via deconstructive subversion, it
remains to be seen whether Butler’s schema of political action
through
subversion
allows
for
distinguishing
and
discriminating between justifiable and non-justifiable
subversive acts. Nussbaum believes it cannot.
IV. JUSTIFYING SUBVERSION
A. “Universal Poststructuralism” and
Nussbaum’s Criticism
Nussbaum claims that Butler and Foucault reject
moral imperatives and principles because according to them,
such concepts are “inherently dictatorial.”44 I take this to
mean that, in Nussbaum’s opinion, poststructuralist theory
such as Butler’s or Foucault’s entails that all claims-based
schemas of justification are always derived from some hidden
arbitrary power structure, which acclaims one principle as
innately true by marginalizing another (without justification,
for the very structure of justification is predicate on the same
type of violence – assuming a privileged metric as the
standard of justification). This is a “universal” version of
poststructuralism because it makes a universal claim against
all privileged concepts.
Nussbaum points out that while Butler may target her
deconstructive powers of subversion against truly unjust
power structures, “[o]thers . . . might engage in the subversive
performances of making fun of feminist remarks in class, or
ripping down the posters of the lesbian and gay law students’
association. These things happen. They are parodic and
subversive. Why, then, aren’t they daring and good?”45
Therefore, Nussbaum claims that
[t]here is a void, then, at the heart of Butler’s
notion of politics.
This void can look
44
45

Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
Id.
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liberating, because the reader fills it implicitly
with a normative theory of human equality or
dignity. But let there be no mistake: for
Butler, as for Foucault, subversion is
subversion, and it can in principle go in any
direction.46
When Nussbaum claims that poststructuralist theory allows
and even promotes subversion in favor of any ideology,
practice, or group (be it good or evil) that is marginalized by
(social) power, she assumes a universal understanding of
what poststructuralism is.
Nussbaum argues that Butler can afford not to tackle
the fact that her philosophical program rejects moral
justification because she writes to an audience of like-minded
people who agree on what the social evils are, such as the
mistreatment of women and gays. In other words, the
correlation that seems to exist between poststructuralist
practice and morally justified political causes (e.g., the
connection between Butler’s theory and feminism, which I
hold to be motivated by some conception of right) does not
derive from her gender or deconstructive theory itself.
Moreover, Nussbaum seems to believe that an adherence to
political
agendas
contradicts
deconstructive
and
poststructuralist theory.
Put differently, according to
Nussbaum, Butler is in fact a “confused moralist” who
perceives herself as a postmodern poststructuralist of the
“Nussbaumian” version (rejecting all truth and condemning
all power), while in fact she is motivated by certain moral
principles and a political agenda of gender and gay justice.47
And, therefore, Butler’s practice is not compatible with her
own theory because “universal poststructuralism” rejects any
attempt at justification grounded in principle or norm. It does
not allow for morally justifying or condemning any power
structure or subversive act. For example, the tactic of
Id.
Butler herself offers another motivation, which seems to derive from a
moral principle, when she writes: “If there is a positive normative task in
Gender Trouble, it is to insist upon the extension of this legitimacy to bodies
that have been regarded as false, unreal and unintelligible.” GENDER
TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xxiii.
46
47
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subversion is open to the oppressed racial minority, as well as
to the outlawed and socially ostracized neo-Nazi.
1. Aversion to Power
One possible answer in defense of poststructuralism
from the common critique is to argue that poststructuralism
does in fact contain a positive normative guiding principle
after all – to be adverse to power. Indeed, there is a seemingly
implicit assumption in poststructuralist rhetoric and certainly
in its deconstructive manifestations, that power should be
challenged.
The “aversion to power” answer derives from a
universal understanding of poststructuralism, arguing that all
(social, political) power, i.e., any relegation of certain concepts,
principles, identities, etc. to other concepts, principles, and
identities in the name of the latter’s value, self-justifying
nature, autonomy, or justness, is somehow bad.
However, the aversion to power answer suffers from
the same inner contradiction as does the confused moralist –
if all power is bad, should not this universal judgment also be
rejected or at least problematized? Is the aversion to all power
not also an assertion that purports to be innately true or just
and hence, must also be a product of some pre-ethical
violence?
Thus, while there seems to be an underlying
assumption in deconstructive thought that power structures
must be exposed and the marginalized elements within such
structures should be freed from their relegation, there is no
room in the universal version of poststructuralism for
evaluating or differentiating just power structures from unjust
ones or even for justifying the general principle of aversion to
all power. Hence, those who argue from morality or justice
while using the poststructuralist schema in its universal
version are simply confused, for they are not true (“universal”)
poststructuralists. I believe this is how Nussbaum would
explain the relation between Butler’s theory and Butler’s
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An account Butler herself has later

2. The Silent Answer – an Argument from
Incommensurability
Another possible answer to Nussbaum is to point out
that she is playing a game of “intellectual solitaire.” The
poststructuralist and deconstructivist need not answer the
moral question – on what principle or value does
poststructuralism and deconstruction justify the rejection of
moral principles and values? The reason being that the
question demands an answer in terms of (moral) justification,
the very criterion and activity that is in contention. The only
proper answer a poststructuralist can offer Nussbaum is
silence. Any attempt to answer Nussbaum would necessarily
require using absolutist categories and logic – the framework
set up by Nussbaum’s criticism. Richard Rorty, in a different
context, expresses this point aptly:
If truths are really convenient fictions, what
about the truth of the claim that that is what
they are? Is that too a convenient fiction? . . . I
think it is important that we who are accused
of relativism stop using the distinctions
between finding and making, discovery and
invention, objective and subjective. . . . We
must repudiate the vocabulary our opponents
use, and not let them impose it upon us.49

JUDITH BUTLER , UNDOING G ENDER 207-27 (Routledge 2004) [hereinafter
UNDOING GENDER].
49 RICHARD RORTY, P HILOSOPHY AND S OCIAL H OPE xviii (Penguin Books
1999). Jane Flax seems to be making a similar point in her work, The End
of Innocence: “Postmodernism is not a form of relativism because
relativism only takes on meaning as the partner of its binary opposite –
universalism. Relativists assume the lack of an absolute standard is
significant: ‘everything is relative’ because there is no one thing to
measure all claims by. If the hankering for an absolute universal
standard were absent, ‘relativism’ would lose its meaning and force.”
48
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This insistence on incommensurability may be what
Butler is alluding to when she explains that while the
aversion from the constraining and violent effect of
normativity may lead many to “say that the opposition to
violence must take place in the name of the norm, a norm of
nonviolence, a norm of respect,”50 that is in fact not her
position.
The notion that there must be some norm
justifying her position imposes on Butler a distinction she
rejects – that between norm and fact.51 It is the very
language or logic of justification Butler seems to be
rejecting.
I find the “silent answer” to the attempt to hold
Butler’s theory to the requirement for justification only
partially satisfactory. In many ways, at least for me, this
answer is just as much a reason for rejecting Butler’s
theory as it is for accepting it. A better answer, in my eyes,
would focus on rejecting the formulation of Butler’s theory
of
political
action
(as
a
poststructuralist
and
deconstructivist theory) in universal terms, actively
demonstrating why the common critique does not land any
real punches.
B. “Contextual Poststructuralism”
Poststructuralism does not necessarily entail a
rejection of all or any moral principles – a statement not
contradicted by the fact that poststructuralism allows for
the deconstruction of privileged principles. I will offer two
arguments for why this is the case. The first derives from
the particularistic and contextual nature of the
Jane Flax, The End of Innocence, in FEMINISTS T HEORIZE THE P OLITICAL
445, 452-53 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., Routledge 1992).
50 UNDOING GENDER, supra note 48, at 206.
51 Id. See also GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15, at xxi (“We may be tempted
to make the following distinction: a descriptive account of gender includes
considerations of what makes gender intelligible, an inquiry into its
conditions of possibility, whereas a normative account seeks to answer the
question of which expressions of gender are acceptable . . . . The question,
however, of what qualifies as ‘gender’ is itself already a question that attests
to a pervasively normative operation of power, a fugitive operation of ‘what
will be the case’ under the rubric of ‘what is the case.’”).
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deconstructive method/act. The second maintains that
under a deconstructive or poststructuralist approach,
privileged concepts have a necessary enabling function for
any deconstructive act or subversive performance.
1.

The Particularistic Nature of the Deconstructive
and Subversive Act
Conceptualizing poststructuralism in universal terms
ignores the temporal, local, and contextual nature of the
poststructuralist’s arguments. When Butler deconstructs
gender, she is better understood as deconstructing “gender” –
as it is understood now, by a particular society, in a specific
context, at a certain time and place. Any act of subversion is,
as we saw, always a particular act performed in a context by
some specific individual within and in relation to some
specific structure. The same is true of Butler’s critique of
“normative judgments” as indistinguishable from powersaturated descriptive accounts.52
In relating to Butler a universal rejection of all
normative principles, all descriptive accounts, and all
privileged concepts, one is making the error of universalizing
and decontextualizing her deconstructive arguments. Butler’s
method of subversion as political resistance does not entail
problematizing moral and normative principles, but rather
“moral” and “normative principles” – not gender, but rather
“gender”53; not normativity,54 but rather “normativity”; not
human nature, but rather “human nature.”55 The “universal”
version of poststructuralism is wrong.
Poststructuralist
theory does not make universal claims, and poststructuralist
theory does not reject all moral principles; at best, it can only
reject the idea of “all moral principles” as it is understood in a
specific context. While Butler is not always sufficiently careful
in clarifying the temporality and particularity of her
deconstructive assertions, the better reading of her theory
would insist on it.

52
53
54
55

GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 15.
Id. at xxi.
UNDOING GENDER, supra note 48, at 206.
Id. at 222.
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One may also be tempted to erroneously deduce from
the fact that deconstruction theory entails that all privileged
concepts are potentially deconstructible that deconstruction
theory also entails that all such concepts are contingent (and
therefore, not really privileged). This is a false move. No
particular act of deconstruction makes universal assertions
and therefore, cannot be used as a basis for inducing a
general claim. This would be a move by a mind prone to
universal reasoning and unattuned to the contextual nature
of the deconstructive act. And, even if we assume a pervasive
potential for deconstruction, all we would be claiming is that
all is potentially deconstructible.
Furthermore, as we learned from Butler’s theory of
identity subversion, for a subversion to take place or exist, it
must take place in a particular subversive act. There is no
ruling, transcendent, pervasive, deconstructive logic outside
concrete deconstructing and subversive acts or performances.
Therefore, to conclude a general assertion, such as “all moral
principles are a product of amoral violence,” from a theoretical
potential for deconstruction is a muddle. The subversion of a
“privileged concept” only takes place if it is indeed actually
successfully subverted. Mere potential for deconstruction will
not do to reject, destabilize, or subvert a privileged concept.
Often one hears proponents of deconstructive and
poststructuralist approaches dismiss outright any attempt at
truth-talk, value-talk, etc. as theological, naïve, and violent.
Often this is done out of an instinctive suspicion towards
privileged concepts as such, and is not based on any careful,
persuasive deconstructive or genealogical argument. Those
who demonstrate such tendencies are guilty of falsely
deducing, through generalizing logic, actuality from
potentiality; are often dogmatic; and by no means count as
performing deconstructive or subversive acts (at best, they are
unknowingly performing a parody of deconstructive acts).
Even if Nussbaum is correct and Butler, in certain places at
least, views all moral principles as “inherently dictatorial,”56
the best version of Butler’s theory and of poststructuralism
and deconstruction in general does not.

56

Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 42.
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To clarify, pointing out the contextual nature of
Butler’s theory of subversion does not entail that Butler’s
arguments are always compelling, only that when they are
not, they are so not because of the common critique. In
deconstructing broad foundational concepts such as “the
political discourse of modernity,” the basic terms of which,
according to Butler, “are all tainted and that to use such
terms is to reinvoke the contexts of oppression,”57 Butler is
not always convincing, but this is not due to some
metaethical defect in her reasoning.
2.

Privileged Concepts and the Background of
Intelligibility

Subversive deconstructive acts are made possible by
some privileged principles and, therefore, such acts always
allow for principle-based judgments. Every subversive act
and every deconstructive move are necessarily diversions from
an otherwise relatively stable structure of meaning. We do
not live within deconstruction; no one can live according to
Derrida’s “differance,”58 just as no one can be a subversion or
a parody – we can only perform subversive and parodic acts.
If we were to become the parody, “we” would become
unintelligible. In other words, the parodic dance on the
margins, the subversive act, and the deconstructive argument
are only intelligible because they are performed in relation to
an otherwise stable background network of meaning. Indeed,
as we saw, in the case of identity subversion one retains
his/her relation of sameness to the identity-type that is being
subverted. Moreover, one never subverts one’s entire identity
or conceptual schema, but only aspects of it. It is only under
such circumstances that subversion becomes intelligible.
Butler’s whole theory of subversion turns on the idea of
subversion “from within,” wherein rejecting (intentionally or
not) one’s entire identity or conceptual schema is
meaningless. This is due to the ubiquitous nature of the
social structure and the fact that we are always-already
EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 8, at 160.
JACQUES DERRIDA, M ARGINS OF P HILOSOPHY 1-28 (Alan Bass trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 1982) (1972).
57
58
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constructed by it. Hence, for their very intelligibility and
possibility, subversive acts are enabled by a rich background
that is relatively stable; a background that is not only not
problematized by the subversive act, but is enabled and
assumed by it.
The background of any deconstructive act or parody is
made up of what is held (assumed) to be true. One may be
tempted to argue that this background is also always
potentially prone to deconstruction and that it too must
originate from a social construction, etc. However, as I argued
earlier (a) such general or universal claims have no weight in
deconstruction; (b) such claims point only to a potential
deconstructive move and do not establish or constitute such a
move; and most importantly, (c) the deconstruction of any
specific background or even of the idea of “background” or
“context” will always in itself presume a (relatively stable)
background of its own. This is inescapable.
Therefore, the poststructuralist (of the “contextual”
persuasion) can continue to wonder about and pass judgment
on the morality and immorality of specific subversions, power,
and violence, even in a world that has stopped believing in the
transcendent. Moral- and principle-based reflection and
judgment are not necessarily ruled out by poststructuralism
and deconstruction. Similarly to the rest of us, the moral
principles the poststructuralist would employ in her practical
reasoning and judgments would derive from the enabling
background structure, only a small part of which would and
could be the object of the deconstructive and subversive act
that background itself enables.
The necessity of some stable background of meaning
does not entail that any specific privileged concept is essential
to subversion and deconstruction, only that the intelligibility
of deconstructive moves require some such concepts.
Therefore, moral and normative concepts do not have to be
assumed in such a background. But, when such moves are
practical, as is political subversion, the background concepts
that enable such actions must include some reasons for
actions, and among the most prominent of such reasons
derive from moral principles and norms. In fact, when
“pushed to the wall,” Butler herself has evoked certain moral
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norms for assessing and judging subversive actions; norms
that are very much in vein with liberal-democratic-leftist
ideology.59 Hence, while Butler’s theory does not necessarily
require that the background enabling political subversion
comprise moral principles, her theory clearly allows for it.
While Butler’s theory necessarily allows for moral
principles or other privileged practical principles to direct our
political actions, it also entails that we must always be wary of
dogmatism. Constant self-scrutiny and critical reflection is
required. We must always be aware that our certainties –
enabling specific acts of parody, subversion, and
deconstruction – may be subject to flux and that what we
once held to be true and just may not be so today. While this
does not mean that what we hold to be just is necessarily
arbitrary or coercive, it does mean that the possibility exists.
CONCLUSION
I tried to defend Butler and, more generally,
poststructuralism and deconstruction from what I called the
“common critique,” which claims that these theories are
amoral and collaborate with evil. I focused on Nussbaum’s
critique of Butler as an example of the common critique and
of a deconstructive poststructuralist theory because, beyond
being a good example, Nussbaum’s essay has gained a
substantial presence within a broad intellectual circle, often
referred to as a classic, effective, and accessible repudiation of
what is sometimes labeled “postmodern” thought.
I argued that the common critique is based on an
erroneous understanding of Butler’s work (or of its better
interpretation) as well as of poststructuralism and
deconstruction theories in general. The better and more
careful version of these theories does not rule out all
principles, including principles of political morality.

59 For example, in assessing the demand of the marginalized fascist for
rights, Butler points out that “[i]t cannot be a good thing to invoke rights
or entitlements to what one considers a ‘livable life’ if that very life is
based on racism or misogyny or violence or exclusion.” UNDOING GENDER,
supra note 48, at 224.

